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ABSTRACT. This paper proposes a conceptual framework for the study of 
public procurement policy.  It reviews policy-related writings by public 
procurement scholars and assesses these works from the perspective of 
their contributions to generalized understandings of public procurement 
policy.  Selected tools and concepts from the policy sciences are applied to 
propose a model to illuminate unique aspects of public procurement policy 
in ways that will facilitate its study.  The paper concludes by discussing some 
recent actions, trends, and issues from the U.S defense procurement sector 
in terms of the framework. Models such as the one proposed in this paper 
will contribute to enhanced approaches to procurement policy analysis by 
scholars, as well as to informed and sophisticated policy implementation by 
practitioners. 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to explore various dimensions of 
public procurement policy.  It proceeds from two major premises.  
First, because public procurement is a relatively new field of study, 
the study of its policy is also immature.  Second, in the same way that 
it draws liberally from other reference disciplines and fields, public      
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procurement can employ concepts and analytical methods from the 
policy sciences (e.g., policy analysis) in order to investigate its own 
policies. 
We do not mean to suggest that public procurement policy has 
received no attention; Arrowsmith & Hartley (2002) provide ample 
evidence to the contrary.  Rather, we argue that public procurement 
scholars have yet to give sufficient efforts to the sort of conceptual 
theorizing about policy that will lead to ordering devices and 
approaches that can help researchers and students make sense of 
its complexity, uses, and limitations.  
Policy science scholars have developed a number of ideas and 
models that should aid in mapping the prominent features of public 
procurement policy’s diverse landscape.  This paper attempts to draw 
upon such conceptual tools and adapt them for the study of public 
procurement policy.  Like most other policy studies, we do not seek to 
theorize for the purpose of developing normative theory; rather we 
seek a construct or framework that will be useful for description and 
explanation in its ability to order facts and ideas about public 
procurement policy in meaningful ways. 
Through its contribution to the intellectual foundations of public 
procurement’s policy, this paper also highlights its strategic 
character.  The traditional view of public procurement as a routine 
and mundane function (Gordon, Zemansky & Sekwat, 2000) has 
been effectively challenged (see for example Thai, 2000; Piga & Thai, 
2006).  Others argue that, under contemporary circumstances, public 
procurement is taking on more of a strategic nature (Leenders & 
Fearon, 1997; McCue & Gianakis, 2001; Hinson & McCue, 2004; 
Matthews, 2005).  This paper proceeds along lines of inquiry 
suggested by Snider (2006; 2008) linking the strategic nature of 
public procurement to its focus on and concerns with public policy.     
The paper begins by reviewing high points from the classic 
literature of the policy sciences, much of which was produced in the 
middle to late 1900s. It then turns to the body of public procurement 
literature that addresses the field’s policy and its conceptual 
frameworks.  It assesses the strengths and weaknesses of these 
studies from the perspective of their contributions to generalized 
understandings of public procurement policy.  It then applies selected 
policy sciences tools and concepts to public procurement to propose 
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another conceptual framework as a means to illuminate unique 
aspects of public procurement policy in ways that will facilitate its 
study.  It concludes by discussing some recent actions, trends, and 
issues from the U.S defense procurement sector in terms of the 
framework. 
THE POLICY SCIENCES 
The fields and disciplines that make up the contemporary policy 
sciences have their roots in late 19th and early 20th century scholars’ 
interests in political decision-making by governmental entities.  The 
increasing complexity of the modern administrative state, coupled 
with the Progressive Era’s confidence in technical rationality to solve 
societal ills, focused attention on public decisions and the processes 
used to reach them.  It was widely believed that, by collecting 
sufficient relevant facts on any particular issue and subjecting those 
facts to scientific analysis, better decisions (i.e., public policies) could 
be reached. 
Policy and Politics 
Such a bias toward empiricism had the effect of insulating the 
emerging policy sciences from “politics,” viewed as the realm of 
normative, value-laden, power-based, subjective decision-making.  By 
the middle of the century, Harold Lasswell could remark that, despite 
their common etymological roots, the word “policy” was free from any 
of the undesirable connotations of the word “politics” (1956, p.5).  In 
addition to Lasswell, prominent policy scientists included Simon 
(1947), Easton (1953; 1965), Vickers (1965), Lindblom (1968), and 
Dror (1968).  In general, their studies investigated basic questions 
surrounding public policy, for example, who makes it, why is it made, 
how is it made, and what areas are targets of policy? 
Public Policy – Definitions 
A few definitions are in order.  First, “public” is generally taken to 
mean that which is held in common by society as opposed to that 
which is held privately or by individuals (but see Parsons (1995, pp. 
2-12) for a nuanced discussion of this distinction).  Second, “policy” 
has been defined simply as “important choices” (Lasswell, 1971, p. 
5).  Peters (2007) laments, “today, everything government does is 
labeled ‘policy’” (p. 4), a condition that he claims frustrates serious 
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analysis.  He defines “public policy” as the sum of government 
activities, whether pursued directly or through agents, as those 
activities have an influence on the lives of citizens.  Such a definition 
would surely include the activities of public procurement--more on 
this point below. 
The Policy Process 
Much attention has been paid to the ways in which and processes 
by which public policy is made.  According to Dror (1986, p. xiii), 
policy-making implies “conscious awareness of choice between 
alternatives for steering society.”  For Parsons, the policy-making 
process is “an attempt to define and structure a rational basis for 
action or inaction” (1995, p. 14).  Several scholars (Lasswell, 1956, 
Mack, 1971; Rose, 1973; Jenkins, 1978) propose a “stagist” model 
that maps the policy-making process into steps such as issue 
definition, agenda setting, formulation, decision-making, 
implementation, and evaluation.  Others have criticized this approach 
as too neat, arguing that policy-making is much more complex and 
often doesn’t conform to any recognizable process (Lindblom, 1980; 
Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980; Stone, 1989).  As former public 
servants, the authors agree with these critics’ assessments of the 
difficulties with the stagist approach.  At the same time, however, we 
recognize the need for some framework that facilitates analysis of 
policy-making.  Accordingly, we make use of the stagist approach as a 
heuristic in our discussion below. 
The Systems Model for Policy Studies 
 The most widely employed conceptual framework in the policy 
sciences is the systems model (Easton, 1953; 1965; Dye 1966), 
which may be seen as an application of general system theory (von 
Bertalanffy, 1968) to public policy.  Figure 1 depicts the familiar 
systems model construct of inputs, some unit of analysis for 
conversion of inputs into outputs, and a feedback loop. 
For many social science applications, this model is referred to as 
an “open systems” model, which reflects the idea that all elements of 
the model are open to influences from the external environment.  
Thus, outputs and feedback are functions not only of the conversion 
element, but of other environmental factors as well.   
 




General Systems Model (top) and the Model Applied to 
Elementary/Secondary Education Policy (Bottom) 
 
 
The systems framework allows for identification, description, and 
analysis of the key components of the system.  It also imparts an 
appreciation for and an understanding of the complex connections 
and interrelationships among various components.  This may 
illuminate the relative importance and relevance of components in 
the production of outputs.  It may allow for identification of 
inefficiencies and pathologies in the system, as well as identification 
of potential solutions for such problems.  The model also calls 
attention to the boundaries of the conversion process; that is, the 
extent to which and the ways in which the process remains distinct 
and separated from the environment.  Finally, the model highlights 
the inherently dynamic nature of an open system, since the external 
environment for complex systems is constantly evolving. 
The model’s merits also indicate some of its shortcomings.  For 
example, though it points out linkages among various components, 
the model cannot capture the full complexity of a significant socio-
technical system, such as a large organization.  Theoretically, each 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE 315 
 
 
part of the system is in some way related to every other part.  The 
systems framework is, like any other model, only a highly simplified 
abstraction of reality.  A similar criticism may be directed toward the 
dynamic character of the open systems framework.  To put it in the 
form of a question: If the system is constantly evolving, how may one 
model anything more than a brief snapshot of the system?  This 
criticism has significant implications regarding attempts to identify 
inefficiencies and promote reforms.  Along these lines, Dye (1966, pp. 
1-19) recognizes that his particular application of the systems model 
for policy analysis is empirical and useful only for explanatory 
purposes.  He admits its serious limitations and inability to provide 
prescriptive remedies or guides for good policy-making.   
Also shown in Figure 1 is an example of the systems model’s 
application in the specific context of elementary and secondary 
education policy (Sharkansky, 1970, p. 68).  In this example, the 
“conversion” box represents specific education policies, as reflected 
in decisions and actions taken by public policy-making entities, which 
in this example are school districts (the unit of analysis) in one U.S. 
state.  Policy outputs are service levels affected by those actions, and 
policy impacts are the effects that services have on a population.  The 
environment represents the social, economic, and political context 
that supplies inputs for education policy and feels its impacts.  In his 
study, Sharkansky attempted to select independent and dependent 
variables that seem capable of depicting relationships between and 
among the environment, policy, and outputs.  (Significantly, with 
regard to the model’s limitations, he was unable to define appropriate 
variables and metrics for the “impact” element of the model.)   
Types of Public Policy 
 Peters’ definition of public policy above referred to its influence 
on the lives of citizens.  Necessarily, public policy affects some group. 
Lowi (1964) identified three categories of public policy that are 
distinguishable according to the degree of disaggregation of the 
treatment the policy in question provides to the group it affects: 
- Distributive policies, such as agricultural subsidies, confer some 
value or benefits on a group. 
- Redistributive policies, such as welfare and unemployment 
programs, rearrange value or benefits between or among groups. 
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- Regulatory policies restrict or otherwise govern some aspect of 
citizens’ activities. 
Lowi further posits a developmental sequence in which 
technologically advanced societies move from principally distributive 
policies to principally regulatory policies (a point we will return to later 
in the discussion).  Salisbury (1968) adds a fourth category of self-
regulatory policies, which are those that delegate regulation authority 
to the regulated group.  An example of such a policy is the authority 
given to the American Bar Association to admit attorneys to practice. 
 Salisbury & Heinz (1970) simplify matters somewhat by grouping 
distributive and redistributive policies under the heading of allocative 
policies, and regulatory and self-regulatory policies under structural 
policies.  These two broad types of public policy are distinguished by 
the extent of ambiguity between winners and losers.  Little such 
ambiguity is present in allocative policies, while in structural policies 
benefits are expressed in abstract terms of rules and structures, and 
any tangible benefits are likely deferred.  In their analysis, Salisbury & 
Heinz hypothesize that the more costly it is to organize the requisite 
coalition on an issue, the more likely it is that the policy outcome will 
be structural rather than allocative.  To give a procurement-related 
example, the U.S. Congress would find it difficult and time-consuming 
to make individual weapons acquisition decisions (allocative policies).  
Thus, it enacts legislation designating positions for acquisition 
decision executives in the Department of Defense (a structural 
policy).  
RELEVANT PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LITERATURE 
 We now turn our attention to the extent to which public 
procurement scholars have addressed the material reviewed above.  
Specifically, we are interested in (1) treatments of public policy in the 
public procurement literature, and (2) public procurement-related 
analytical frameworks that may be useful in understanding public 
procurement policy. 
“Policy” in Public Procurement 
 A review of selected public procurement research reveals a 
tendency to treat the field in a way that distances it from “policy.”  
Arrowsmith (1995), Knight et al. (2003), Bolton (2006), and Knight et 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT POLICY: IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE 317 
 
 
al. (2007) portray public procurement as a tool, mechanism, 
instrument, or lever for promoting what they label as “policies” such 
as industrial and economic development and assistance to 
historically disadvantaged groups.  From the systems model’s 
perspective, however, such policies could more precisely be labeled 
desired results (either outputs or impacts), which governments 
attempt to achieve through specific procurement policies.  Knight et 
al. (2003; 2007) provide useful case descriptions and make brief 
mention of supply policy, but again, their attention is on supply policy 
as a lever for government reform.  That is, they emphasize the 
desired result (reform) rather than the specifics of supply policy.  
  Others (e.g., Schooner & Whiteman, 2000) use “policies” when 
referring to principles such as transparency, probity, competition, and 
value for money.  Again, the systems perspective would classify these 
principles as desired results (outputs or impacts) to be achieved 
through procurement policies. Such treatment of public procurement 
deflects attention from its policy aspect that determines the extent to 
which it contributes to desired outcomes.  Consequently, we find that 
very little attention has been devoted to the study of public 
procurement policy qua policy. 
To the extent that the public procurement literature does address 
policy, it seems to center either on structural policies or on allocative 
policies, but not both.  The lack of attention to both types is notable, 
since achievement of the principles and other outcomes mentioned 
above are clearly functions both of structural and of allocative 
policies.  
Examples of discussions that focus on structural policies include 
those in the areas of domestic sourcing (Arrowsmith, 1995), use of 
purchase cards (Schooner & Whiteman, 2000), dual-sourcing 
(Burnett & Kovacic, 1989), green procurement, e-procurement, and 
several others (Knight et al., 2003).  These writers’ lack of attention 
to allocative policies may be attributable to their choosing to think of 
procurement decisions (e.g., contract awards) as something other 
than policies.  Nevertheless, such decisions are allocative public 
policies that confer benefits on some groups and not others.  Indeed, 
such decisions are political ones—not in the sense of involving 
partisan politics—but political ones nonetheless.  Even minor 
procurement actions may be considered “street-level policy.”  
Perhaps, however, like last century’s policy scientists, some public 
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procurement scholars and practitioners prefer to take an 
instrumentalist view of the field in order to insulate it from any 
association with potentially undesirable connotations of “politics.” 
Regarding allocative policies, several works detail the 
circumstances of specific procurement programs and decisions (e.g., 
Stevenson, 1993; 2001; Kotz, 1988; Dempsey et al., 1997; Farrell 
1997).  Many of these have the character of “exposés” of problem 
procurements rather than of  scholarly policy studies.  The emphasis 
in these works is often on how less-than-rational political factors 
influenced major allocative policy-making.  To a large extent, these 
authors neglect the vast array of structural policies that serve to 
control and guide to successful conclusions the great majority of 
procurement actions.  By focusing on the few “bad apples,” they fail 
to consider the positive effects of structural policies on the rest of the 
bunch.  
To summarize, scholars view public procurement mainly as an 
instrument to further various goals, and they focus on either its 
structural or its allocative policies.  Our review of the policy sciences 
literature, however, indicates that any study purporting to examine 
the whole of public procurement policy must necessarily treat it 
explicitly as policy, and it must account for both policy types. 
Analytical Frameworks for Studying Public Procurement 
 Several public procurement scholars have proposed models for 
analyzing various aspects of the field.  Thai (2000) adapts the 
systems model to capture “the whole scope of public procurement” 
(p. 17).  He is particularly concerned to portray the core elements of 
any procurement system and the relationships between and among 
them.  Thai places the policy-making function with management 
executives at the top level of a procurement system.  This has the 
effect of discounting the importance of policy roles that may be 
played in other elements of his model, for example, his “regulations” 
element or his “operations” element (pp. 17-18). 
 Many researchers (e.g., McCue & Gianakis (2001)) have modeled 
the public procurement process as a series of phases of activity such 
as procurement planning, formalization, implementation, and 
evaluation.  Though none of these models explicitly addresses policy, 
we note that, to some extent, the phases of this process correspond 
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to the stages of the policy-making process, a point to which we will 
return later. 
 Harland et al. (2000) explicitly set as their objective the 
development of a “conceptual framework for public supply” (p. 349).  
They review existing models, document shortcomings, and construct 
their own model, which has ties to the systems model.  While their 
discussion mentions policy, Harland et al. are more concerned with 
capturing the full range of environmental and contextual influences 
on supply actions, which may include policy-making.  Their model thus 
seems optimized for analysis of the input and conversion elements of 
the systems model, but it does not appear to give explicit attention to 
its other elements. 
 We conclude from this review that existing analytical public 
procurement frameworks, while perhaps valid for their developers’ 
respective purposes, do not enable comprehensive study of public 
procurement policy. 
A FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC PROCUREMENT POLICY 
 As our concern is public procurement policy, our own model 
(Figure 2 provides an example of the model applied to defense 
procurement) makes use of several of the aforementioned concepts 
from the policy sciences. We begin with the open systems construct 
of inputs, conversion, outputs, and feedback.  A distinctive feature of 
our model is the explicit depiction of the unit of analysis’ policy/ 
conversion elements for both policy types—structural and allocative.  
Each of these receives particular inputs from the environment (which 
the model by Harland et al. (2000) may be useful for analyzing).  We 
use the term “meta-policies” as another label for structural 
procurement policies since they serve to govern and regulate other 
policy-making.  Examples of structural policies are procurement laws 
and regulations, decision-making authorities, and resources such as 
procurement staffs and support organizations. These serve as part of 
the external environment for and provide inputs to allocative policies, 
such as individual defense procurements and programs. 
 Outputs of allocative and structural policies vary accordingly.  
Outputs of structural policies occur as those policies are applied in 
allocative policies, as when a policy favoring small businesses is 
enacted with a contract award to a  small  business.   Structural policy 








outputs are thus deferred and evident in outputs of allocative 
policies.  For allocative policies, outputs may consist of metrics 
directly associated with the effectiveness of the item or system 
procured, or they may be ancillary results such as facilities and jobs 
that the procurement creates.   
 We include an intermediate stage—outcomes—between outputs 
and impact.  Here we wish to emphasize that higher-order results, 
such as successful defense, a robust industrial base, and small and 
medium enterprise (SME) metrics are functions both of allocative and 
of structural policy outputs.  Finally, “impact” corresponds to even 
higher-order effects such as the transparency, probity, and value-for-
money principles mentioned earlier.  The relevant procurement 
environment reflects the extent to which such impacts are 
manifested. 
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 We also display in our framework the stages of the policy-making 
process above.  Obviously, the process for making specific allocative 
policies will differ from that for making specific structural policies.  (As 
noted above, the process for allocative policy-making is closely tied to 
the public procurement process modeled by McCue & Gianakis 
(2000) and others).  The processes for the two policy types will 
necessarily be intertwined, as allocative policies must account for 
relevant structural policies and vice versa. We include the stages of 
the policy-making process because of their correspondence with the 
“flow” of the systems model.  The definition and agenda setting 
stages align with the depiction of inputs that flow from the 
environment.  Formulation, decision-making, and implementation 
correspond roughly to the conversion element, and evaluation figures 
in determinations of outputs, outcomes, and impacts.  Depicting 
these stages adds granularity to the basic systems model by calling 
attention to the types of activities associated with each of its 
elements. 
DISCUSSION – ACTIONS, TRENDS, AND ISSUES 
In this section, we explore some aspects of this framework and its 
implications.  Specifically, we want to discuss some recent policy 
developments in the U.S. public procurement sector in terms of the 
preceding discussion.   
Public Procurement Policy’s Complexity and Importance 
Our framework highlights the inherent complexity of public 
procurement policy and its making. The preceding discussion has 
indicated the difficulty in attempting to capture this complexity in any 
single analytical framework. The most appropriate framework—the 
systems model, with its depiction of an ever-evolving environment—
helps explain why public procurement is constantly reforming.  Finally, 
the discussion has also revealed the difficulty in achieving various 
desired outcomes and impacts, since those are functions of many 
different policies, both structural and allocative.   
Several recent developments in U.S. procurement illustrate this 
complexity.  In particular, they illustrate the challenges of making 
procurement policy in environments characterized by urgent and 
sometimes conflicting demands.   
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Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
The contracts awarded in support of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
relief efforts have been criticized by both the media and government 
oversight organizations.  Although some of the contracts in response 
to these natural disasters were awarded in minimal time, these 
contracts resulted in less than desirable outcomes. For example, in 
response to an urgent need for portable classrooms, the Army Corps 
of Engineers was able to award a contract for portable buildings in 
minimal time, using compressed negotiations.  The Corps was able to 
leverage a pre-existing agreement for portable buildings and issued a 
non-competitive order on that contract.  The portable buildings were 
delivered in a timely manner, but the contract had to undergo 
frequent amendments to reflect evolving procurement requirements.  
In addition, there were concerns after the contract award that the 
Corps was paying too much for the portable buildings (Government 
Accountability Office, 2005). 
 A similar example includes the procurement of cruise ships for 
use as temporary housing for hurricane evacuees.  The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) needed “10,000 berths on 
full-service cruise ships…..and it needed the deal done by noon the 
next day” (“$236M Cruise Ship Deal,” 2005).  The U.S. Military Sealift 
Command held an urgent one-day competition, receiving proposals 
from 13 ships, with only four ships meeting the specific procurement 
requirements and receiving contract awards (Government 
Accountability Office, 2007).  For a variety of reasons, however, the 
ships experienced low occupancy during the weeks following the 
hurricanes (Department of Homeland Security, 2006).  Politicians 
have criticized this contract for paying “exorbitant prices” and 
describing it as “a grossly overpriced sweetheart deal for a cruise 
line” (“$236M Cruise Ship Deal,” 2005). 
 In these cases, the environment’s demand for urgency drove the 
making of immediate allocative decisions by invoking special 
emergency procedures.  Many governmental entities create such 
contingency procedures (i.e., structural policies) in order to expedite 
procurement decisions (i.e., allocative policies) in special 
circumstances.  These structural policies have the effect of 
simplifying the allocative policy-making process by shortening or 
eliminating its stages.  It’s evident that, in the zeal to satisfy the 
urgent need, policy-makers paid insufficient attention to the 
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procurements’ requirements.  Thus, while the desired outcome of 
timeliness was achieved, other outcomes were not.   
Iraq Reconstruction   
The contracts awarded for reconstruction and military operations 
support in Iraq have also come under scrutiny.  The criticisms of 
these contracts focus more on the procurement methods used to 
acquire these urgent supplies and services, specifically addressing 
the issue of competitive or non-competitive contract awards.  A 
variety of structural policies, including the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) and applicable statutes, requires the use of full and 
open competition in awarding contracts, or proper justification and 
authority for using other than full and open competition procedures.  
In addition, policies require that, when issuing task orders under 
existing contracts, these task orders must be within the general 
scope of the basic contracts.  Recent analysis of Iraq reconstruction 
contracts determined that agencies generally complied with 
applicable laws and regulations in awarding contracts using other 
than full and open competition procedures.  For example, the Army 
Corps of Engineers appropriately awarded a sole source contract for 
Iraq oil infrastructure reconstruction to one contractor who was 
determined by the agency to be the only contractor that could meet 
the requirement (Government Accountability Office, 2004).  Although 
this sole source contract was awarded in accordance with statutory 
and regulatory requirements, there still exists a perception of 
“cronyism and a lack of transparency” in the procurement process 
due to close ties between senior government officials and the 
contractor (“The Triumph of Cronyism,” 2008).  
 The contract awarded by the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) for major infrastructure reconstruction work in 
Iraq is another example of such controversy.  Due to its large contract 
value and use of less than full and open competition, the contract 
award to Bechtel resulted in a high level of controversy.  USAID 
initially had sent the Request for Proposal (RFP) to seven potential 
contractors, with a two-week response time. Three declined to 
submit, and only two of the remaining four submitted competitive 
bids.  The contract award was made to Bechtel using a cost-
plus/fixed-fee “letter contract” (Department of Defense Special 
Inspector General, 2006).  Although the USAID Inspector General’s 
review of the Bechtel contract award concluded that the agency had 
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complied with all applicable federal regulations, except for the rule 
requiring notification and timely debriefings to unsuccessful offerors, 
perceptions of cronyism and favoritism in the procurement process 
remained (“The Triumph of Cronyism,” 2008).  
 In these cases, demands from the environment were apparently 
so stringent that competition was minimal. Even though structural 
policies were followed, many perceived the procurements to be 
biased.  In some cases, then, policy-makers may simply have to 
accept that their decisions will be unpopular and subject to criticism.   
Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicle  
In response to the increasing number of coalition casualties from 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) attacks, the Department of 
Defense (DOD) initiated the acquisition of Mine-Resistant Ambush-
Protected (MRAP) vehicles in 2007.  The Secretary of Defense made 
MRAP the DoD’s top priority acquisition program, which led to an 
aggressive acquisition approach, including compressed contracting 
processes, a 24/7 testing schedule, and multiple contract awards in 
order to ramp up production activity. However, the DoD acknowledges 
that it may “encounter manufacturing, spare parts, and maintenance 
issues….[and] is accepting these risks in order to provide more 
capable vehicles to our troops as absolutely fast as possible…” 
(“Herculean Work”, 2007).  Of course, a major consequence of this 
highly accelerated acquisition approach will be the lack of a 
developed infrastructure for logistical and sustainment support of 
these vehicles.  With multiple contractors manufacturing uniquely-
designed vehicles, the logistical footprint for providing training, 
maintenance, and spare parts may prove to be costly in the long run. 
 Here, the urgent demands of the environment for immediate 
fielding of enhanced troop protection have led to the setting aside of 
many structural policies.  From the perspective of policy-makers, cost 
factors in this case simply do not enter into consideration.   
Relationships between Allocative and Structural Policies 
 Recall Lowi’s (1964) hypothesis that technologically advanced 
societies reflect increased reliance on structural rather than 
allocative policies.  With respect to public procurement, mature 
societies wish to promote principles such as transparency and 
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probity.  They turn to regulations, laws, and other structural features 
to govern applications of allocative procurement policies, which may 
lead to graft, corruption, “pork,” and other undesirable outcomes.  It 
remains, of course, for Lowi’s hypothesis to be tested, but several 
questions arise which deserve further attention.  For example, do 
structural policies contribute to bureaucratic “red tape”?  Do they 
decrease responsiveness to the customer of procurement, and do 
they sacrifice value-for-money for greater accountability and control?  
If so, removal of “non-value-added” structural policies 
(“deregulation”) may be preferred. 
FASA and the C-130J Aircraft 
In 1994, the U.S. Congress passed the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FASA).  This revolutionary legislation, unlike 
previous procurement legislation that implemented tight controls and 
strict contracting codes, repealed or substantially modified over 200 
contracting statutes and requirements.  The FASA was instrumental in 
streamlining the government procurement process by eliminating 
non-value added requirements (Lumer & Ireton, 1994).   
 One significant aspect of the FASA was the preference for 
commercial contracting methods and the preference for acquiring 
commercial items that meet the requirements of the government.  
FASA even resulted in the establishment of specific procedures and a 
separate part of the FAR (Part 12) for the acquisition of commercial 
items.   
 In 1996, the Air Force leveraged this streamlined commercial 
acquisition policy when it awarded a FAR Part 12 contract to 
Lockheed Martin for the purchase of 117 C-130J cargo aircraft for the 
Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard at a cost of $7.45 billion 
(Department of Defense Inspector General, 2004). Though the Air 
Force had previously purchased the C-130 as a military item, it 
determined that the aircraft was now a commercial item as defined 
by the FAR, since it would need only minor modifications to meet the 
government’s requirement.  Since the Air Force was using a 
commercial contracting approach, it did not have the usual extent of 
oversight or access to contractor cost and pricing data.  However, an 
investigation revealed that the C-130J commercial specification did 
not meet the user’s requirements, forcing the addition of 
requirements at additional expense to the government.  Due to the 
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commercial approach used in this acquisition, the government could 
not have access to contractor pricing data in negotiating the costs for 
the additional requirements.  The Air Force contracting officer was 
thus limited in his ability to protect the government against 
overpricing.  Aircraft prices rose from $33.9M in 1995 to $49.7M in 
1998 to $66.5M in 2004. (Department of Defense Inspector General, 
2004, p. 5). 
 In the case of the C-130J, eliminating structural policies through 
FASA led to a poor allocative policy.  Had the pre-FASA regulations 
remained in effect, the adverse outcome described above could have 
been avoided.  Clearly, then, structural policies have value.  Further, 
while structure may lead to bureaucracy, structural policies may, 
under certain circumstances, enhance allocative policy-making.  The 
1990’s U.S. acquisition reform movement (linked to then-Vice 
President Gore’s “Reinventing Government” initiatives) emphasized 
efficiency, flexibility, and streamlined processes.  In some cases, 
reforms entailed “deregulation”—that is, a reduction or removal of 
structural acquisition policies, such as in the FASA case.  In contrast, 
other reforms reconfigured structural policies in order to increase 
efficiency and achieve other benefits.  For example, the policy 
instituting the “integrated product team (IPT)” approach in program 
review and oversight did not eliminate requirements for review and 
oversight.  Rather, it called for those functions to be accomplished 
using teaming approaches and principles with the intent of deriving 
benefits associated with well-functioning teams.   
 Another example of a relatively new structural policy is the 
institution of vendor past performance as a mandatory source 
selection criterion in major contracting decisions.  While clearly 
intended to add value to the procurement action, the policy has also 
led to an increased number of bid protests in individual allocative 
policies, due to the increased complexity and ambiguity in the source 
selection process (Snider & Walkner, 2001). 
 Such questions that touch on relationships between structural 
and allocative policies deserve study.  Knight et al. (2003, pp. 124-
125) note the tensions and, in some cases, inconsistencies between 
and among the different public procurement principles sought as 
outcomes by nations.  Exploring such tensions within the allocative-
structural policy construct may be profitable. 
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Trends toward Structural Procurement Policies in the U.S 
The creation of centralized procurement organizations and the 
use of omnibus-type contracts is an example of the DoD migrating to 
structural procurement policies.  The Air Force’s establishment of 
commodity councils (Rendon, 2005) as a centralized approach to 
procure supplies and services common to a variety of end-users is 
one example.  The commodity sourcing strategy, which focuses on 
developing a specific sourcing strategy for a category or group of 
supplies or services, involves the development and application of a 
carefully crafted strategy for the procurement of quality supplies and 
services at the lowest cost (Gabbard, 2004).  The success of 
commodity strategies is based on maximizing the cost-reduction 
advantages of leveraging combined buying power for volume 
discounts, using market experts to formulate a sourcing strategy, and 
finally, forming strong relationships with preferred suppliers (Reed et 
al., 2005).  Commodity councils have been established for 
information technology supplies and services, medical supplies, and 
force protection services. 
 Another example of this trend is the establishment of regional 
procurement organizations to provide procurement support to 
specific geographical regions of the Air Force.  With the current 
decentralized procurement approach, there is the potential for 
“inconsistencies in contracting practices throughout the Air Force, 
redundant purchases of similar commodities and an inability to 
leverage the size of the service to increase its purchasing power” 
(“Bases Loses Some Control,” 2008).  The centralized approach is 
intended to allow the Air Force to use personnel more efficiently, save 
money through quantity purchases, reduce delivery times, in addition 
to enhancing visibility, accountability and consistency in the 
acquisition process.   
CONCLUSION 
The conceptual framework developed in this paper and the 
ensuing discussions are offered to stimulate the interest of public 
procurement scholars and practitioners in the policy of their field. 
Clearly, this is only a tentative first step; much more work is required.  
The model requires critique and further development before it 
can be applied. For example, referring back to Figure 1 and its 
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illustration of elementary/secondary school education policies, we 
note the variables and metrics chosen in each element.  Before 
public procurement policy can be studied in a similarly rigorous way, it 
remains for public procurement researchers to determine appropriate 
variables, metrics, and hypotheses concerning their relationships.  
In performing this research, the authors were again reminded of 
public procurement’s importance in its pervasive influence 
throughout society. The effects of public procurement are felt in many 
different substantive policy areas – defense, education, energy, 
transportation, environment, and health care, to name just a few.  
Public procurement policy is a principal determinant of outcomes in 
each of those areas.  Thus, it would seem to deserve the same extent 
of executive and academic attention that is paid to other areas of 
public administration such as budgeting and financial management, 
human resource management, and information management.  
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